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The Molotov cocktails, looting and sniping which wracked nearly
eighty American cities this past summer have taken a heavy toll in lives
and property damage.1 The totals may rise in future years, as long as the
frustrations and despair of the urban ghetto resident make themselves
felt in civil disturbances and riotous destruction. During the past four
years, the insured damage attributable to urban riots has tripled, from
an estimated cost of between $6.5 and $8.5 million in 1964,2 to approxi-
mately $40 million in the Los Angeles riots in 1965,3 to an estimated
$125-200 million in 1967.4 Absent any sign of a lessening in ghetto ten-
sions, the forecast can only be for more and more destruction.
As a result of this increasing risk of insuring property in ghetto neigh-
borhoods, insurance companies have indicated that they will not con-
tinue to insure against riot damage in riot-threatened areas,' at least not
without large rate increases. Insurance rates in the Watts area of Los An-
geles trebled after the riot," and rate increases have been substantial in
other riot-affected cities as well.7 Property owners in ghetto neighbor-
hoods have been forced to bear a large portion---estimates range from 25
per cent to 50 per centS--of the riot damage this summer. The trend
towards withdrawal of insurance protection from the slums will throw
an even greater share of future riot loss upon ghetto property owners,
especially upon ghetto merchants whose small neighborhood stores
bear the brunt of the riot-inflicted damage.
Economic exploitation of the poor by merchants in slum areas, such as
charging higher prices for goods because slum residents do not have the
means of shopping selectively outside the slum area," has been sug-
1. From April 1, 1967, to September 4, 1967, 83 persons were killed, 3,210 were injured,
and an estimated $524.8 million worth of property was destroyed as a result of riots.
Library of Congress, Survey of Racial Violence 3 (Sept. 14, 1967).
2. U.S. Nmvs & WoRLD RE2ORT, Aug. 30, 1965, at 21.
3. State of California, Department of Insurance Press Release, Aug. 20, 1955.
4. Press Release by Governor Hughes, Chairman of President's Advisory Panel on
Insurance in Riot-Affected Areas, Sept. 15, 1967, at 2. This includes $85 million in insured
losses from the Detroit riots and $15 million from the Newark disturbances. All damage
figures are approximations since uninsured loss can only be estimated and no official
tabulations are kept even on insured losses.
5. See U.S. NEvs & WORm REPORT, Aug. 14, 1967, at 45.
6. THE WEEKLY BOBusBUYER, Aug. 21, 1967, at I, col. 1.
7. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Aug. 16, 1965, at 16, col. 8; U.S. NEWs & WVom Rxr.vr, Aug.
14, 1967, at 45.
8. Hughes, supra note 4.
9. According to residents of Watts, the cost of traveling to distant supermarkets has
limited many residents to one or two trips per month and forces the rest to trade with
the little comer stores whose prices are higher than the supermarkets'. Jones, The Fiew
from Watts Today, Los Angeles Times, July 18, 1967 (unpaged reprint). Part of the
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gested as a reason for the outbreak of violence in the ghetto. 10 But the
profit margins of these merchants are not high enough to enable them to
bear the costs of riot damage. As a result, merchants have been driven
out of the ghetto whenever insurance protection or other forms of riot
compensation are unavailable." The demands of insurers for higher
rates12 and the anticipated cancellation of insurance coverage in the
ghetto, such as that which followed the Watts rioting,13 can only acceler-
ate the departure of commercial business from the slums.14 Such depar-
tures produce not only a loss of services to the ghetto, but also a loss of
jobs for its residents and an intensification of the feelings of Negro slum-
dwellers that society has left them behind in its mad dash for material af-
fluence.
Therefore, even on the assumption that the "exploiting" merchant is
somehow "responsible" for the riot damage, placing the damage burden
on slum property owners would not be a satisfactory solution. Since the
appropriate goal of any such policy must be to achieve a proper balance
between spreading15 and deterrence,"; placing the burden of future riots
on ghetto merchants would not produce satisfactory results. Costs would
not be spread. They would be borne by the merchants themselves and
by the ghetto residents who could be forced to pay higher prices for
poorer service. Nor would deterrence be achieved, since (1) merchants
are more likely to respond to the increase in their costs by withdrawing
their services from the ghetto or by raising their prices than by reducing
their prices in order to deter future riots, and (2) residents are at least as
additional cost of trading with the smaller ghetto stores is, of course, dte to the small
volume in such a small-scale business, but some of the increased price may be due to
marketplace considerations such as inability of residents to trade elsewhere. See note 10
infra.
10. See testimony mentioned in GOVERNOR'S COMm'N ON Tim Los ANGELES RIOTS, Vio-
LENCE IN THE CITY-AN END OR A BEGINNING? 62 (1965).
11. Many of the stores struck by the 1965 Watts riots did not reopen following the
violence due to prohibitively high insurance rates or the reluctance of insurers to write
policies in the burned-out areas of Watts. In addition, only one grocery store and two
small clothing stores represent new business in Watts since the riots. Jones, supra tote 9.
12. THE WEEKLY BOND BUYER, Aug. 21, 1967, at 10.
13. See authorities cited note 5 supra. The problem of cancellation has been tempo.
rarily abated by moratoriums on "mass cancellations" imposed by state insurance colno
missions. Hughes, supra note 4, at 3.
14. As an alternative to pulling out, the merchant could pass on riot costs to the
consumer in the form of higher prices. The hardship imposed on the slum-dweller Is the
same whether the merchant leaves the neighborhood or tries to pass on his flot costs to
the consumer, i.e., the resident is forced to travel to distant stores to purchase goods and
services at prices he can afford.
15. Such spreading of losses will also result in a smaller "real" burden of riot damage,
because secondary losses such as business failure in the riot area are more likely to be
eliminated. See Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts,
70 YALE L.J. 499, 517 (1961).
16. See generally Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents: An Approach to Nonfault
Allocation of Costs, 78 HARV. L. REv. 713 (1965).
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likely to respond to the threat or actuality of such withdrawals or price
increases by rioting as by abstaining from such activity. For similar rea-
sons, placing the burden of loss directly on the rioters themselves is not a
satisfactory-much less a practicable-solution.7 Thus it appears that
the cost of future riots must be spread among a larger segment of the
population.
I. Private Methods of Allocating the Riot Damage Burden
A. The Present System of Insurance
The standard fire insurance policy covers all fire losses, including fire
loss resulting from riots or other civil disturbances.' 8 Protection against
non-fire losses is provided by "extended coverage" clauses at an addi-
tional cost.19 Such clauses normally cover non-fire losses, including theft
and vandalism, arising from riots, civil commotions and strikes, but ex-
clude coverage of losses resulting from war, insurrection, revolution or
civil war.2 0 Under fire and extended coverage policies in force during
the past summer, insurance companies have paid, or are expected to pay,
some $110 million in claims arising from 1967's urban riots.21
Yet insurance company officials have made it clear that they will not
continue to absorb losses of this magnitude.-2 2 By cancelling policies or
raising rates-which would require the acquiescence of state insurance
commissionsn insurance companies will avoid future losses from riot
damage. Even where policies on ghetto property are kept in force by
17. Legally, the individual rioters are liable in ordinary tort for the damages their
actions have produced. But this remedy can be useful only when the particular rioter can
be identified, served with process and collected against. Also, any participant in the riot
can be held liable for the full amount of the riot damage, whether or not he individually
caused the damage complained of, if a conspiracy can be proved. See De Vries v. Brum-
back, 53 Cal. 2d 643, 349 P.2d 532, 2 Cal. Rptr. 764 (1960) and cases cited therein. See also
Note, Mass Demonstrations and Criminal Conspiracies, 16 HasT. L.J. 465 (19651. But cf.
Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963). Some state statutes have eliminated the
need to prove a conspiracy and hold individual participants vicariously liable for all riot
damage, e.g., NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:48-5 (1952); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 11823 (1956);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-109 (1962).
18. Comment, Insurance Protection Against Civil Demonstration, 7 B.C. IND. & Cons.
L. R v. 706 (1966); see, e.g., MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 175, § 99 (1959); Mxc. STAT. ANN.
§ 24.12832 (1957). Without a clause specifically including coverage for fire loss resulting
from riot, a fire insurance policy which excludes liability for riot damage has been held not
to cover fire loss resulting from a riot. Luckett-Wake Tobacco Co. v. Globe & Rutgers
Fire Ins. Co., 171 F. 147 (C.C.W.D. Ky. 1908).
19. Comment, Insurance Protection Against Civil Demonstration, supra note 18, at
706 n.10.
20. Washington Star, July 26, 1967.
21. THE IVr.Vy BoNo' Bu rn, Aug. 21, 1967, at 1.
22. See statement of James L. Bently, President of the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners, id.
23. See, e.g., Mica. STAT. ANN. § 24.12608 (1957); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:29A-7 (1963);
N.Y. INsTrRAxcE LAw § 186 (McKinney 1966).
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state insurance commission "moratoriums" on cancellations, 2' the in-
surer may seek to escape liability by claiming that the riots constitute an
"insurrection" and thus that liability is excluded in the extended cover-
age agreement.20
In the only case construing the "insurrection" clause in a fire insur-
ance policy, the First Circuit held that an intent to overthrow the gov-
ernment must be present in order for violence to constitute an "insur-
rection."20 Home Ins. Co. v. DavilaW involved an insurer's attempt to in-
voke the "insurrection" clause to avoid liability for damage caused by an
armed band of Puerto Rican nationalists who took control of the town
of Jayuya, Puerto Rico, for one day before being driven out by units of
the National Guard.28 The court interpreted the word "insurrection" as
a movement accompanied by action intended to overthrow the govern-
ment. This is, perhaps, a reasonable interpretation in light of the fact
that the categories of excepted perils, including an "insurrection," are
laid down by statute' and the legislature probably intended that the or-
dinary meaning be employed.
However, future judicial decisions on the meaning of the "insurrec-
tion" clause may reach different results8 0 or the insurance companies
24. See note 13 supra.
25. "There is no question but that the troubles border on insurrection," stated Robert
Braddock, president of the General Reinsurance Company of New York City, referring to
the Newark riots. TnE WEEKLY BOND BUYER, Aug. 21, 1967, at 10. Speculation that insurers
might attempt to avoid liability was enhanced by New Jersey Governor Richard Hughes'
characterization of the Newark riots as an "insurrection" in statements to newsmen, and
by rumors that Michigan's Governor Romney had refused to declare the Detroit riots
an "insurrection" out of fear that insurance coverage would be nullified, Washington Star,
July 26, 1967. However, insurers, publicly at least, have thus far refused to invoke the
"insurrection" escape clause. Id. This may be the result more of a desire to retain a
healthy "public image" than of a fear of a court test on the "insurrection" issue.
26. Sometimes the word "insurrection" is used to characterize an outbreak or dis.
turbance more limited in its objective than the forcible overthrow of the government
.... But we are dealing here with the meaning of "insurrection" in an Insurance
policy which expressly covers fires set in consequence of a "riot"; and which con-
tains no exclusion of fires caused by a "civil commotion" ..... Therefore, we think
the district judge correctly told the jury that, to constitute an insurrection or rebellion
within the meaning of these policies, there must have been a movement accompanied
by action specifically intended to overthrow the constituted government....
Home Ins. Co. v. Davila, 212 F.2d 731, 736 (lst Cir. 1954). Cases which define the word
"insurrection" as something less than "forcible overthrow" for the purposes of a criminal
statute making "insurrection" an offense, e.g., In re Charge to Grand Jury, 62 F. 828
(C.C.N.D. Ill. 1894), are not applicable to the meaning of "insurrection" in fire insurance
policies, according to the Davila court.
27. 212 F.2d 731 (1st Cir. 1954).
28. Id. at 732-34. The court reversed a verdict for the insured on the grounds that the
trial judge had instructed the jury on the evidence presented as to the Nationalists' motive
and purpose in a manner too favorable to the insured. Id. at 738. However, the court ap.
proved the definition of "insurrection" employed by the trial judge, note 26 supra.
29. See, e.g., statutes cited note 18 supra; Extended Coverage Endorsement No. 4, Un.
form Standard New England Form No. 758 (1962).
30. A suggestion that the "insurrection" clause should be an escape from the liability
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may attempt to include riot damage within the list of specifically ex-
cepted perils. These possibilities, coupled with the reluctance of insur-
ers to continue policies covering slum property and their insistence on
rate increases, illustrate the inability of the present insurance system to
compensate riot victims adequately.
B. Urban Area Plans
The President's Advisory Panel on Insurance in Riot-Affected Areas,
headed by Governor Richard Hughes of New Jersey, has recommended
the adoption of "Urban Area Plans" as a means of making private insur-
ance available to ghetto property owners.3 1 Under this plan, insurers,
who join the plan voluntarily,3 2 guarantee to insure all property in a
given urban area which meets physical standards of insurability set by
the insurer. Insurance brokers would be allowed to make on-the-spot in-
vestigations of slum properties and could add surcharges to cover both
the cost of inspection and any physical deficiencies found.P Under pres-
ent state law, insurers must set uniform rates within areas delineated by
the relevant state authority3 4 The Urban Area Plans in effect allow the
insurer to vary insurance rates according to the physical condition of the
property in return for a guarantee that insurance will be available in
slum areas despite the potential for riots. The plans, now being devel-
oped or in effect in Boston, the Watts area of Los Angeles, New York,
San Francisco and Oakland, have the additional advantage of encourag-
ing slum property owners to improve the condition of their property in
order to qualify for lower insurance rates.
However, these Urban Area Plans will be of little use if insurers find
it unprofitable to insure slum property, even with the permissible
discrimination in rates based on physical condition, because of the high
risk of riot damage liability. Insurance companies may decide, as they
seem to be deciding at present, that it is better not to insure at all
in a given urban area than to accept, without compensating rate in-
creases, the uncertain risks of riot damage.30
of the insurer may be found in Comment, Insurance Protection Against Ciuil Demnonstra-
tion, supra note 18, at 712.
31. Hughes, supra note 4, at 2.
32. "The] voluntary factor... would be a little defect in the plan." Id. at 6. How-
ever, there is no constitutional obstacle to a state's making participation in such plans
compulsory for all insurers doing business in the state. California Auto. Assn v. Maloney.
341 US. 105, 110-11 (1951).
3. See U.S. Nmvs & WORLD REPORT, Aug. 14, 1967, at 45. Insurance coverage could still
be refused for buildings which are uninsurable for physical reasons, rather than location
in a particular ghetto area. See Hughes, supra note 4, at 6.
34. See, e.g., statutes cited note 23 supra.
35. Hughes, supra note 4, at 8; U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT, Aug. 14, 1967, at 45.
36. Since riot damages cannot be actuarialized, it is impossible for insurance companies
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C. Assigned Risk Fire and Extended Coverage Insurance
State insurance commissions have the power to force reluctant
insurers to write policies for fire and extended coverage insurance,
including coverage of major riot damage, under an "assigned risk"
plan. Most states have such "assigned risk" statutes for automobile lia-
bility insurance.3 7 The Supreme Court has upheld the power of the
state to require insurers to accept assigned risks as a condition of doing
business in the state. In California Auto. Ass'n v. Maloney,38 the insurer
argued that the "assigned risk" plan would "force on insurers contracts
that have abnormal risks and from which financial loss may be ex-
pected . . . ,39 and thus was an unconstitutional taking under the
fourteenth amendment's due process clause. The Court, however,
replied: "Appellant's business may of course be less prosperous as a
result of the regulation. That diminution in value, however, has never
mounted to the dignity of a taking in the constitutional sense.
'40
Yet assigned risk automobile insurance policies allow the insurer to
limit the amount of coverage and charge higher premiums for these
risks.41 Thus, while the rationale of the Maloney decision can be
extended to cover assigned risk fire and casualty insurance, the amount
of riot protection provided by such policies may be too little, and the
cost of the premiums too great, to keep merchants in the ghetto neigh-
borhoods or attract new business to the slums.
A state could force insurers to accept assigned risk fire and casualty
contracts without allowing an increase in premium rates on such con-
tracts. As the Court said in Maloney, "[In insurance], as in the banking
field, the power of the state is broad enough to take over the whole
business, leaving no part for private enterprise."4 Exercising its rate-
making power,43 a state could decide that the burden of riot loss is a
burden "which modem conditions have made incident to the business
[of insurance]."4 This would ultimately place the burden of loss on
all policyholders of the company, as the insurer would be forced to
to establish rates which reflect the risks they will be undertaking. The extent of the liabil.
ity which they incur in a major riot such as the violence in Detroit and Newark mitigates
against their trading some rate flexibility for a guarantee of coverage in riot-prono areas.
37. See, e.g., N.Y. INSURANcE LAw § 63 (McKinney 1966); MASS. ANN. LAWs cit. 175
§ 113H (1959). i
38. 341 U.S. 105 (1951).
39. Id. at 108.
40. Id. at 111.
41. This permission to charge higher rates for assigned risks was a factor in the
Maloney court's decision that the plan was not "confiscatory" in violation of the Due
Process Clause. Id. at 108.
42. Id. at 110.
43. See generally German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389 (1914).
44. California Auto Ass'n v. Maloney, 341 U.S. 105, 109 (1951).
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raise rates across-the-board in order to maintain the same level of profit.
Or, if an overall rate increase were not feasible or not permitted by
state insurance commissions, the burden would fall on stockholders of
insurance companies.4 In either case, losses would be spread arbitrarily
and inadequately. Moreover, no "general deterrence pressure" (deter-
rence through the imposition of costs) 40 would be brought to bear
through rate increases or decreased stockholder dividends, since neither
stockholders nor policyholders are in a position to prevent future riots.
If, on the other hand, the insurer were allowed to raise his rates in the
ghetto areas alone, marginal businesses might withdraw from the areas
in question.
In short, private methods of compensating riot victims are inade-
quate in that they provide insufficient compensation (limited-coverage
assigned risk plans), generate considerable external social costs (driving
the merchants out of the ghetto through higher rates or inability to
secure coverage), secure little or no deterrence of future riots (placing
the burden on stockholders or spreading it to non-ghetto policyholders),
and spread the loss arbitrarily and inadequately. Therefore, govern-
mental or public solutions must be sought.
II. Public Methods of Allocating Riot Damage Burdens
A. Judicial Solutions
Allocating the burden of riot loss to state and local governments
would be a method of spreading the loss which could incorporate deter-
rence of future riots, since these agencies arguably are in a position to
provide the police protection and other services whose present inade-
quacy is a factor in the transformation of ghetto grievances into vio-
lence. However, the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity, un-
less abrogated by statute or judicial decision, shields state and municipal
governments from liability in court for failure to protect life or
property.47
Without their consent, state governments are not liable for any
negligence on the part of their officers, whether arising from their
45. In the case of "participating insurers," passing on profits to policyholders in the
form of dividends, rather than paying dividends on stock certificates, the policholders
again bear the burden in decreased dividends.
46. The term belongs to Professor Calabresi. Calabresi, supra note 16, at 733.
47. Chicago v. Sturges, 222 U.S. 313 (1911); Gianfortone v. N w Orleans, 61 F. 64, 66
(C.C.E.D. La. 1894); see Borchard, Governmental Liablity in Tort, 34 YALE .J. 1 (1924);
James, Tort Liability of Governmental Units and Their Officers, 2 U. Cmi. L. REv. 610
(1955); Vanlandingham, Local Governmental Immunity Re.examined, 61 Nw. L REv. 237
(1966).
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"governmental" or their "proprietary" functions, under the general
rule "the king can do no wrong. 48 Municipal corporations, on the
other hand, are not "sovereign" and thus cannot take advantage of
the ancient theory of monarchical immunity employed by the states.' 0
But municipal corporations have been considered immune from the
consequences of their negligence with respect to their "governmental"
as distinguished from their "proprietary" functions8 0 While there is
disagreement over the rationale behind this distinction, it has been
suggested that municipal immunity in the performance of the munic-
ipality's "governmental" functions is an extension of the immunity
of the sovereign state,rl while in the performance of "proprietary"
functions the municipality is not carrying out "sovereign" functions
but is acting in the same capacity as a private corporation.52 Whatever
the explanation, the courts have been woefully unable to develop a
satisfactory test for distinguishing between these two classes of func-
tionsY3 although it is generally established that police activity falls
within the "governmental" sphere ' and hence that local governments
are immune from liability for failure to protect property.
Two states, New York": and Washington, 6 have waived by statute
the state's immunity from negligence suits, and the courts of both
states have extended that waiver to abolish the immunity of local
bodies.57 Other states have admitted some degree of liability in special
48. James, supra note 47, at 615-21.
49. Why the states were ever given the monarchical privilege of immunity is unclear.
It is one of those "established doctrines" that were imported into the American common
law without reasons being given or sought for. See United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 2'07
(1882); Borchard, supra note 47, at 2; 3 K. DAVIS, ADMNISTRATIVE LAV 438 (1958).
50. James, supra note 47, at 622. The history of this governmental-proprietary distic-
tion is disputed-see Vanlandingham, supra note 47, at 242, 247-but the general view of
American courts is that it descended from the 1788 English case of Russell v. Men of
Devon, 2 T.R. 667, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (1788). The doctrine of municipal immunity was
imported into American jurisprudence in 1812, Mower v. The Inhabitants of Leicester,
9 Mass. 247 (1812), and the governmental-proprietary distinction was firmly established
by 1842, Bailey v. Mayor of New York, 3 Hill 531 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1842).
51. James, supra note 47, at 623.
52. Vanlandingham, supra note 47, at 247 & n.56, and cases cited therein.
53. "The only safe guides are precedent and the underlying attitude towaid contrac-
tion or expansion of municipal liability with which the problem is approached." James.
supra note 47, at 625. James' article contains a detailed analysis of the case law construing
the distinction. An up-to-date account of the Ohio Supreme Court's wrestling with the
distinction may be found in Hack v. Salem, 174 Ohio St. 383, 189 N.E.2d 857 (1963).
54. See, e.g., Gianfortone v. New Orleans, 61 F. 64 (C.C.E.D. La. 1894) (failure to prevent
mob violence resulting in death); King v. City of New York, 3 Misc. 2d 241, 152 N.Y.S.2d
110 (Sup. Ct. 1956) (failure to prevent picket line violence).
55. N.Y. CONsT. art. 6, § 23; N.Y. JUDICIARY LAiW, COURT OF CLAIMS Aar § 8 (MeKinney
1963).
56. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 4.92.090 (Supp. 1963).
57. Bernardine v. City of New York, 294 N.Y. 361, 62 N.E.2d 604 (19,15); celso v.
Tacoma, 63 Wash. 2d 913, 390 P.2d 2 (1964). The Washington statute, WASH. Rev. Coin
ANN. § 4.92.090 (Supp. 1963), admits liability for torts committed by state officials "whether
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situations, but none have, by statute, strayed very far from the haven
of sovereign immunity.58 State courts, however, after decades of strug-
gling with the governmental-proprietary distinction, have attempted
to undo the injustices embedded in tort law by the judicially created
doctrine of municipal immunity.
The first of what proved to be many of these attempts was the 1957
decision of the Florida Supreme Court holding a municipality liable
for the wvrongful death of a jail inmate who suffocated from smoke
inhalation due to the negligence of the city jailor, even though the
function was admittedly "governmental." r5 9 The court in Hargrove v.
Town of Cocoa Beach examined the precedents and questions of policy
and concluded:
The modem city is in substantial measure a large business
institution. While it enjoys many of the basic powers of govern-
ment, it nonetheless is an incorporated organization which exer-
cises those powers primarily for the benefit of the people within
the municipal limits who enjoy the services rendered pursuant
to the powers. To continue to endow this type of organization with
sovereign divinity appears to us to predicate the law of the Twen-
tieth Century upon an Eighteenth Century anachronism. Judicial
consistency loses its virtue when it is degraded by the vice of in-
justice.60
Since the Florida decision, the courts of nine other states have
abolished municipal immunity.61 In some of these cases, the sovereign
acting in [their] governmental or proprietary capacity," but tie Washington Supreme
Court has resurrected the common law distinction by narrowly construing the statute to
maintain immunity for "discretionary acts" of public officials. Evangelical United Breth.
Church v. State, 67 Wash. 2d 246, 407 P.2d 440 (1965).
58. See the state-by-state analysis and summaries in Leflar & Kantrowitz, Tort Liabil-
ity of the States, 29 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 1363 (1954).
59. Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957).
60. Id. at 133. The sweeping abrogation of municipal immunity in Hargrove must be
qualified, however, as remnants of the governmental-proprietary distinction remain. Under
present Florida law, municipalities are not liable for negligence involved in "matters of
judgment" by city officials, or in "legislative" or "judicial" acts. See, e.g., Modlin v.
Washington Ave. Food Center, 178 So. 2d 596, 603 (Fla. App. 1965) (failure to inspect a
building); Steinhardt v. North Bay Village, 132 So. 2d 764 (Fla. App. 1961) (employing
untrained and incompetent fireman); Raven v. Coats, 125 So. 2d 770 (Fla. App. 1951)
(providing police for a particularly dangerous intersection).
61. foliter v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 18 Ill. 2d 11, 163 NE.2d 89
(1959); McAndrew v. Mularchuk, 33 N.J. 172, 162 A.2d 820 (1960) (for acts of commission
but not for acts of omission); Muskopf v. Coming Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d
457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961); Williams v. City of Detroit, 364 Mich. 231, 111 NV.,2d 1
(1961) (prospective overruling); Holytz v. City of Milmaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W2d
618 (1961); City of Fairbanks v. Schaible, 375 P.2d 201 (Alaska 1962); Spanel v. Mounds
View School Dist. No. 621, 264 Minn. 279, 118 N.W.2d 795 (1962) (prospective o~erruling);
Stone v. Arizona Highway Comm'n, 93 Ariz. 384, 381 P.2d 107 (1963); Hancy v. City of
Lexington, 386 S.W .2d 738 (Ky. 1964). See generally Vanlandingbam, supra note 47.
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immunity of the state was abolished as well,0 2 but most state courts
contented themselves with abrogating only municipal immunity." The
road to municipal liability has not been an easy one, however; state
legislatures in almost every state where immunity has been judicially
abolished have quickly re-established at least partial immunity. For
example, the legislatures of Illinois,14 Minnesota,05 Michigan,"0 and Cal-
ifornia 7 have reacted by restoring full or partial immunity to counties,
school districts and municipal corporations. In other state supreme
courts, the doctrine of municipal immunity has been examined and
approved in recent decisions, usually over strong dissents.08 The view
62. See, e.g., Stone v. Arizona Highway Comm'n, 93 Ariz. 384, 381 P.2d 107 (1963);
Williams v. City of Detroit, 364 Mich. 231, 250, 111 N.W.2d 1, 20 (1961).
63. In some cases, the courts were precluded from abolishing the immunity of the
state by state constitutions conditioning the right to sue upon legislative authorization;
see Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 216, 359 P.2d 457, 460, 11 Cal. Rptr.
89, 92 (1961); Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 41, 115 N.W.2d 618, 625 (1962).
64. Immediately after Moliter, in 1959, the Illinois legislature restored Immunity to
counties, ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 34, § 301-1 (Supp. 1066), and park districts, ILL. SrAT. ANN.
ch. 105, § 12.1-1 (Supp. 1966). The Illinois Supreme Court responded by declaring the
immunity statutes unconstitutional as an "arbitrary classification" violating art. IV, § 22
of the Illinois constitution prohibiting special immunity grants to corporations. Harvey v.
Clyde Park Dist., 32 Ill. 2d 60, 203 N.E.2d 573 (1965); Hutchings v. Kraject, 34 11. 2( 379,
215 N.E.2d 274 (1966). This prompted the legislature to repeal the previous immunity
acts and enact the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity
Act, ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 85, §§ 1-101 to 10-101, which grants immunity to all local govern-
ments and obviates the "arbitrary classification" objection made in Harvey.
65. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 466.12 (1963), restoring school district immunity through 1967
following the state supreme court's decision in Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist, No.
621, 264 Minn. 279, 118 N.W.2d 795 (1962). In the same act, the Minnesota legislatture
codified the Spanel court's extension of tort liability to municipal corporations. MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 466.02 (1963).
66. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 3.996(107) (Supp. 1965), restoring full state immunity for go-
ernmental functions, thus re-establishing the old governmental-proprietary distinction,
after four members of the Supreme Court of Michigan had declared: "From this date
forward the judicial doctrine of governmental immunity from ordinary torts no longer
exists in Michigan." Williams v. City of Detroit, 364 Mich, 231, 250, Ill N.W,2d 1, 20
(1961) (dissenting opinion). See also Myers v. Genesee County Auditor, 375 Mich. 1, 113
N.W.2d 190 (1965). The new law may prove to be a stitch in time which will save the
city of Detroit extensive damage claims as a result of 1967's riots, claims which otherwise
would have been maintainable under the holding in Williams v. City of Detroit, 3684 Mich.
231, 111 N.V.2d 1 (1961). See the discussion of the 1965 law in Keenan v. County of Mid.
land, 377 Mich. 57, 138 NAV.2d 759 (1966). But see Wall Street Journal, Aug. 31, 1967, at
8, col. 2, for a suggestion that at least one insurance company hit by the Detroit riot losses
may challenge the law.
67. CAL. Gov'T. CODE §§ 818,2, 821, 846 (1963); see discussion note 75 infra.
68. Tesone v. School Dist. No. RE-2, 152 Colo. 596, 384 P.2d 82 (1963); Boyer v. Iowa
High School Athl. Ass'n, 256 Iowa 337, 127 N.W.2d 606 (1964); Parker v. City of Hutchin-
son, 196 Kan. 148, 410 P.2d 347 (1966); Nelson v. Maine Turnpike Auth,, 157 Me, 174,
170 A.2d 687 (1961); Weisner v. Board of Educ. of Montgomery County, 237 Md, 391,
206 A.2d 560 (1965); Fette V. City of St. Louis, 366 S.W.2d 446 (Mo. 1963); Gossler v, City
of Manchester, - N.H. -, 221 A.2d 242 (1966); Clark v. Ruidoso-Hondo Valley
Hosp., 72 N.M. 9, 380 P.2d 168 (1963); Fetzer v. Minot Park Dist., 138 N.W.2d 601
(N.D. 1965); Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 389 P.2d 476 (Okla. 1961);
Dillon v. York City School Dist., 422 Pa. 103, 220 A.2d 896 (1966); Conway v. Humbert,




expressed in these decisions is that municipal liability is a matter more
appropriate for the state legislature to establish or reject, since the
issue presents questions of the solvency of municipal corporations, the
quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial powers exercised by such agencies
of state and local government, and the ability of such entities to secure
adequate liability insurance. The prompt legislative reaction in states
where the courts have abrogated the traditional doctrine, evidencing
disapproval of sweeping judicial abolition of municipal immunity, has
also been a factor which has discouraged courts in other jurisdictions
from scuttling the established precedents.O Thus the trend towards
judicial abrogation of immunity for cities and other local governmental
units seems to have been halted in recent years by a wary "Let's let
the legislature do it" attitude on the part of state judicial organs.70
Moreover, riot damages would not necessarily be recovered in property
owners' actions against the state or municipality even if state and local
immunity were legislatively or judicially abrogated. The claimant must
first prove that negligence was involved, and this requirement poses
serious problems for the aggrieved property owner: how many police-
men should the state have called in? how should the authorities have
known about the impending violence before it erupted? how did the
actions of the police spur the rioters to greater violence? Some or all
of these questions must be answered before a negligence suit will be
successful. Also, these issues involve areas of legislative discretion, sucl
as the number of police to be employed in a particular neighborhood,
which should not be invaded by judicial hindsight.7' Recognizing their
inability to second-guess the wisdom of these essentially legislative deci-
sions, courts have generally refused to allow actions whid seek to hold
a municipality liable for the consequences of its "discretionary acts."
7 -
Therefore, the abrogation of a state's or municipality's tort immu-
69. See Boyer v. Iowa High School Athl, Ass'n, 256 Iowa 337, 342-,146, 17 N.W.2d 606,
609-11 (1964), and cases cited note 68 supra,
70. Of the nine jurisdictions which have expressly considered the question since 1964,
only one has abolished immunity by judicial decision. See notes 61 & 68 stupra.
71. A persuasive argument on this point can be found in 3 K. DAvis, AOmw=stsrAnT
LAw 489-91 (1958); cf. James, supra note 47, at 655, The Supreme Court has excluded
liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act for a "discretionary act" in Dalehite v. United
States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953). See also Weiss v. Fote, 7 N.Y.2d 579, 167 N.E.2d 63, 2100
N.Y.S.2d 409 (1960); Lipman v. Brisbane Elem. School Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 224, 359 P.2d 465,
11 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1961). See generally 3 K. DAvis, supra at 472-87 (1958) and 110-15 (Supp.
1965).
72. Weiss v. Fote, 7 N.Y.2d 579, 586, 588, 167 N.E.2d 63, 66-67, 200 N.Y.S.d 409, 413-15
(1960); Raven v. Coats, 125 So. 2d 770 (Fla. App. 1961). See the restatement of the
New Jersey court's rule that the state and its municipalities are immune from the conse-
quences of their nonfeasance in UcAndrew v. Mularchuk, 33 N.J. 172, 195, 102 A.2d 820,
833 (1960).
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nity would provide only limited help to riot victims, especially since
the provision of adequate police protection is a "discretionary act."13
As a scheme for the compensation of riot victims, both the variegated
state of the law of sovereign immunity and the limitations on recovery
arising from the "discretionary acts" doctrine make state and local tort
liability impracticable. In addition, such a system would be extremely
costly, for it would require each property owner to pay the legal costs
of maintaining the suit; this economic factor might deter many ghetto
property owners from attempting to secure compensation. 4
B. Legislative Solutions at the Local Level
Since control of police and administrative actions involved in sup-
pressing or deterring riots is particularly the province of the state and
municipal legislative bodies, it may be appropriate to turn to these
agencies for a solution. Fifteen state legislatures have enacted special
liability statutes imposing liability on the municipality or county for
damages caused by "riotous or tumultuous assemblages. ' 7" These stat-
utes, some of which have been in force for over a century7 0 are descen-
73. Raven v. Coats, 125 So. 2d 770 (Fla. App. 1961) (failure to provide policeman at
allegedly dangerous intersection).
74. When the damaged property is insured, the insurer would be subrogated to the
victim's claim against the state or city. In this instance, there would be no deterrence
to maintaining the suit.
75. CoNN. GE . STAT. ANN. § 7-108 (1958); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-201 (19,19); KY.
Rv. STAT. ANN. § 411.100 (1963); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 17, § 3354 (1964); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 82, §§ 1-3 (1957); MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 269, § 8 (1956); Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 537.140.
.160 (1959); MONT. REv. CODE ANN. § 11-1503 (1957); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:53 (1955);
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:48-1 to 48-7 (1952); N.Y. GEN. MUNIC. LAw § 71 (McKinney 1965) ;
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, §§ 11821-26 (1956); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 45-15-13 (1956), S.C. COoa
ANN. § 16-107 (1962); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 66.091 (1961). Note, Municipal Liability for Riot
Damages, 16 HAsT. L.J. 459, 462 (1965).
However, three states have repealed their statutes.
Louisiana's law was repealed in 1966, No. 51, [1855] La. Acts (repealed 1966).
California's act, ch. 81, § 1, [1949] Cal. Stat. 259-60 (repealed 1963), was repealed as a
consequence of Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr.
89 (1961) which abolished immunity for all state governmental units. Acting on the advice
of the California Law Revision Commission, which called the statute "an anatlironisin
in modern law" as a consequence of Mushopf, 4 CALIFORNIA LAw REvIsIoN CoMM'N RtP,,
RECOMmENDATIONS & STUDIES 301 (1963), the legislature in 1963 enacted a new statute
specifically conferring on public entities and employees immunity from liability for fallure
to enforce the law, CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 818-2, 821, 846, "Our timing was damned good,"
said Raymond Momboisse, deputy attorney general of California, reflecting on the "narrow
escape" from liability for the 1965 Watts riots. Wall Street Journal, Aug. 31, 1967, at 20,
col. 5.
Illinois has also repealed its statute. Wall Street Journal, Aug. 31, 1967, at 1, col. 6, the
Illinois statute, § 1-4-8, 11961] Ill. Laws 576, was amended in 1965 in the aftermath of
the Moliter imbroglio, discussed note 64 supra.
New York's riot-liability statute, N.Y. GEN. MUNic. LAw § 71 (McKinney 1965), has been
suspended since 1942 by the Defense Emergency Act, N.Y. UNCONsoL. LAws § 9193.3 (Mc-
Kinney 1961).




dents of the English Statute of Winchester of 128577 and the English
Riot Act of 1714.78
However, the existing state statutes impose only a limited liability
on local governments. Only Connecticut, Kansas and Wisconsin allow
recovery for personal injury as well as property damage. Massachusetts,
Rhode Island and Maine permit recovery of only three-fourtls of the
value of the property destroyed or damaged, 70 and impose a 550 mini-
mum for claims against the municipality. Connecticut, Kentucky and
Maryland disallow recovery when city or police authorities could not
have prevented the riot through the exercise of reasonable diligence.,
Almost all of the statutes provide that there can be no recovery if the
"claimant's negligence contributed to the destruction," 8' or if the
claimant failed to exercise due diligence in protecting his property or
in notifying public authorities of an impending riot,82 or if the claim-
ant's conduct was "illegal or improper."83 The statutes have varying
definitions of what constitutes a mob or riotous assembly: Kansas and
Massachusetts require five or more persons, Rhode Island requires six
or more, the Illinois statute before its recent repeal8 4 required 20 or
more, and Maine requires 12 or more with clubs or weapons or 30
or more unarmed or armed. The rest are content with vague defini-
tions like "mob, riotous assembly or assembly of persons engaged in
disturbing the public peace."8 5 In addition, almost all of the statutes
allow the local government which is forced to pay a riot damage claim
to recover against the participants in the violence, in subrogation of
the riot victims' claims.86
The burden on the potential plaintiff under these statutes, except in
77. 13 Edw. 1, c. 2, 3 (1285).
78. 1 Geo. 1, c. 5 (1714), now embodied in the Riot Damages Act of 1886, 49 & 50
Vict., c. 38 (1886); the English statutes impose absolute liability on the "police district"
for riot damages. See Note, Municipal Liability for Riot Damage, 16 HAsr. I.J. 459, 460.61
(1965).
79. In Massachusetts, property stolen during a riot is not covered by the riot-liability
statute. Yalenezian v. Boston, 238 Mass. 538, 131 N.E. 220 (1921); accord, Goldman v.
Foreier, 68 R.I. 291, 27 A.2d 340 (1942). Contra, Solomon v. Kingston, 96 N.Y. 651 (1881).
80. In Maryland, the police authorities must have had the actual ability to prevent the
injury complained of, MD. ANN. CODE art. 82, § 2. Most states having such statutes do not
require such a showing. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 11822 (1956); Allegheny' County
v. Gibson, 90 Pa. 397 (1879); Iola v. Birnbaum, 71 Kan. 600, 81 P. 57 (1905); Chadburne v.
Newcastle, 48 N.H. 196 (1868).
81. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:48-3 (1952).
82. See, e.g., ME. R v. STAT. ANN. ch. 17, § 3354 (1964); N.H. RE. STAT. AN%. § 31:54
(1955); 'WIs. STAT. ANN. § 66.091 (1961).
83. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 11822 (1956); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-108 (1962).
84. Note 75 supra.
85. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-108 (1958).
86. See, e.g., N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 31:54 (1955); PA. STAT. ANN. it. 16, § 11824 (1956);
RI. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 45-15-14 (1956); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-111 (1962).
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Connecticut, Kentucky and Maryland,87 is less than that required to
prove negligence on the part of police authorities in a general tort
action against the municipality, because the statutes provide for abso-
lute liability for riot damage on the part of the local governmental
unit in the absence of some contributory negligence or dereliction of
duty on the part of the victim.88 This may in part be the cause of the
rash of claims filed by Newark property-owners under New Jersey's
riot-liability law-over 100 claims, usually with a common count al.
leging negligence in the failure to provide police protection, have been
filed. 9 Similar suits are being prosecuted in Boston following the vio-
lence in the Roxbury section; 125 claims totaling $1.7 million have
been filed in Chicago from the 1966 rioting under the now-repealed
Illinois statute; and claims have also been filed in Milwaukee and
Philadelphia."
Placing the financial burden of riot loss on municipalities through
such special statutes does provide a measure of deterrence of future
rioting. Community liability stimulates a community concern for
the maintenance of law and order 91 and a community effort to
eliminate the serious and long-standing grievances which might lead
to violence if neglected too long. Yet municipal governments today
do not have the resources to compensate adequately the victims of such
extensive rioting as took place in Newark, Detroit and elsewhere. 02 The
shift of population and wealth to the suburbs has left the central city
with a decreasing tax base at a time when demands for city services are
on the rise.93 The fragmentation of taxing authority between center
city and suburban towns and counties makes it difficult, if not impos-
sible, for the relevant municipal government to find the revenue to
pay for the sudden and heavy damage produced by major riots 4 Where
metropolitan areas cross state boundaries the fragmentation problem
is even more severe.
87. See p. 553 supra.
88. Northern Assur. Co. v. City of Milwaukee, 277 Wis. 124, 277 NAW. 149 (19118), anid
cases cited note 79 supra. Absolute liability was a means of deterring mob violence by
encouraging strong local action in suppression of violence. Clark Thread Co. v. Frceholders
of County of Hudson, 54 N.J.L. 265, 23 A. 820 (1892). In this regard, the statutes are true
children of the Statute of Winchester.
89. Wall Street Journal, Aug. 31, 1967, at 20, col. 5.
90. Id.
91. See Note, Municipal Liability for Riot Damage, 16 HAsT. L.J. 459, 464 (1905).
92. "'A lot of big cities could go broke ... . says James J. Sullivan, Jr, Boston's corpo.
ration counsel, the public official responsible for defending the city against claims growing
out of rioting that occurred there in June." Wall Street Journal, Aug. 31, 1967, at 1, col. ,
93. ADvIsoRY COM'N ON INTERGOVERNAIENTAL RELATIONS, GOVERNMENTAL STIIUCUarI,
ORGANIZATION, AND PLANNING IN METROPOLITAN AREAS 15 (Comm. Print 1961).
94. Id. at 13. L. EmsoN, THE FINANCES OF METROPOLITAN AREAS 135-.39 (1964).
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This fragmented structure of local governmental bodies also severely
reduces the deterrent effect of placing the riot burden on municipal-
ities. Without close cooperation from adjoining suburban areas, metro-
politan police forces and community agencies cannot develop the tools
to enforce law and order and extinguish the fires of ghetto grievances.a
Such cooperation and riot-prevention planning is not well developed
at this time. 6 Therefore, local municipal governments cannot do an
adequate job of deterring riots or preventing their violence, and local
governments cannot pay for them once they occur. This economic
reality, however it may conflict with the theoretical possibilities for
riot deterrence at the local level, forces us to turn to the states and the
federal government.
C. Legislative Impetus at the Federal Level
The federal government possesses the resources to compensate the
victims of riot damage adequately. Placing the burden on the federal
government also accomplishes the widest possible loss spreading and,
therefore, imposes the smallest burden on the individual taxpayer. 7
While state governments can draw on a wider tax base than munic-
ipalities, state revenues are often derived mainly from general or special
sales, use, or gross receipts taxes which are regressive, falling hardest
upon the low income groups. 8 States have not been eager to finance
the services required by the modern metropolitan city, and it is unlikely
that they could alone bear the burden of extensive riot damage.
In contrast, the federal government has been active in promoting
urban development and in providing financial assistance for urban
programs.99 The so-called "war on poverty"'-10 has attacked those urban
problems which are most clearly connected with the ghetto frustrations
which lead to riots. A method of spreading the loss of riot damage,
therefore, is an appropriate and logical continuation of any such effort
to eliminate the problems of poverty.
There are several alternatives which could be employed in such a
95. See L. EusoN, supra note 94, at 137; ADVISORY Cos.. ON INTERGovEr sMENrAL RE-
LATIONS, MNrROPOLIrAN SOCIAL AND EcoNOMIc DIsPI'AIEs: IMPLICATIONS FOR IrTncovmN-
MENTAL RELATIONS IN CENTEAL CITIES AND SUBURBS 52-54 (1965).
96. Such intergovernmental planning between county, town and city police forces has
been notably hard to obtain and jealously resisted by local communities. See M. PoCK,
CONSOLIDATING POLICE FUNCTIONS IN MIETROPOLITAN AREAS 1-5 (1962).
97. See note 15 supra.
98. L. ELISON, supra note 94, at 11.
99. See T. HUTCHINSON, fETROPOLTAN AREA PROBLmS: Tim RoLE OF TuE FEDEnAL
GOVERNME on (1961).
100. The Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2701.2981.
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loss-spreading scheme. The most straightforward method would be
direct federal insurance of ghetto property. There is no doubt that
the federal government has the power to effectuate such a plan, since
in the insurance field, "the power of the state is broad enough to take
over the whole business"'u0 and Congress has the power to supersede all
state authority.10 2 Direct federal insurance, however, would involve
high administrative costs and would sacrifice all "general deterrence
pressure" to the goal of compensation. 10 3
A more practicable scheme is federal re-insurance of private fire and
casualty insurers. This type of program is embodied in the Federal
Flood Insurance Act of 1956.104 Under this act, the Federal Housing
and Home Finance Administrator was empowered to provide re-insur-
ance against flood damage, because Congress found that "insurance
against certain losses resulting from this peril is not so available ...
[and] that the safeguards of insurance are a necessary adjunct of pre-
ventive and protective means and structures."' 05 Under this program,
the federal government can subsidize up to 40 per cent of the cost
of flood insurance premiums. 0
The similar unavailability of fire and casualty insurance in the ghetto
has prompted the introduction of legislation to create a "Federal
Re-insurance Corporation" with authority to re-insure "property and
casualty" losses "attributable to riots or civil disturbances."1 7 Under
this legislation, private insurers would issue policies to ghetto property
owners at rates reflecting normal risks and would be re-insured by the
federal government. The re-insurance premiums would be federally
subsidized to the extent that they reflected the added risk of riot
damage. This plan maintains an essentially private system of insurance
and eliminates the administrative costs which would be incurred if the
federal government directly wrote insurance contracts covering slum
property, yet it shifts the risk of riot damage to the federal government.
101. California Auto. Ass'n v. Maloney, 341 U.S. 105, 110 (1951).
102. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 553 (1914), the
Court holding that the business of writing insurance policies across state lines was within
the Commerce Clause and thus under congressional control. Congress, however, those to
leave insurance regulation to the states in the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C, § 1011
(1963).
103. See note 46 supra.
104. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2401-21 (1964).
105. Id. § 2401.
106. No funds were appropriated for the execution of this program in 1956. The Senate,
however, has continually passed appropriation and modifying legislation, most recently the
National Flood Insurance Act of 1967. S. 1985, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), see SENATI!
Cor. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, S. REP. No. 549, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
107. See, e.g., H.R. 12654, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 6 (1967), introduced by Represcnta.
tives Dingell of Michigan, Adams of Washington, and Moss of California.
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Such a plan could be combined with an "Urban Area Plan" or an
"assigned risk" plan to require the availability of insurance in the
ghetto,05 while spreading the burden of riot damage nationwide.
Here too, however, the deterrence value realizable from imposing riot
costs on a specific "category" of persons,0 9 i.e., persons or govern-
mental entities who are in a position to prevent riots, is lost.
This deterrence could be realized, and adequate loss spreading ac-
complished, if the federal government insured state and local govern-
ments against riot damage which they agreed to bear. In other words,
the state and local governments could admit liability for riot-caused
damage through special statutes somewhat like the present state riot-
liability statutes discussed above. 10 They could then secure insurance
from the federal government "below cost," so that the federal govern-
ment would still bear the major share of the financial burden of riot
loss. The premiums charged to state, local or municipal entities--the
choice of which entity would be left to the state legislature-would be
based on the ability of the state or local government to pay, the past
riot record of the area, and other criteria reflecting the willingness of
these entities to prevent riot violence."' This flexibility in re-insurance
rates would encourage the development of local measures to deter riots
and eliminate the causes of riots, and thus help to realize the goal. A
federal insurance program of this type, conditioned on the passage of
state laws admitting liability, would probably be readily accepted by
every state which now faces extensive riot-damage claims or mass can-
cellation of private insurance policies in its urban slums.
One ticklish problem remains: what is "riot-caused" damage for
purposes of state liability and federal insurance? The existing state
liability laws are hardly instructive since their definitions of a riot
range from violence created by five or more persons to 30 or more 12
108. Federal re-insurance could be conditioned on the adoption by' state legislatures of
"'Urban Area" or "assigned risk" plans. Such a technique was emplo)ed in the Federal
Flood Insurance Act of 1956, under which the Administrator was empowered to 'write
re-insurance contracts only in those states which enacted zoning laws to restrict property
development and use in flood-prone areas. 42 U.S.C. § 2411(c) (1954).
109. See Calabresi, supra note 16, at 733-34, where the same point is made regarding
automobile accident insurance.
110. Such a statute should create absolute liability in the state and local government
-apportioned between them as the state legislature desires-for all riot loss which is not
the result of willful or wanton misconduct on the part of the property owner. (T e limita-
tion on liability is necessary to insure that property owners take reasonable steps to protect
their property, but allows a lower than usual standard of care in consideration of the high
risks involved in protecting one's property during a riot.)
111. Such criteria might include the degree of law enforcement agency coordination
and consolidation, the proficiency of police training in riot-control tedniques, and the
quality of state and local anti-riot planning.
112. See p. 553 supra.
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and the case law construing these statutes is spotty and inconclusive.""'
One definition has already been accepted by one branch of Congress:
"a riot is a public disturbance, involving acts of violence by assemblages
of three or more persons, which poses an immediate danger of damage
or injury to property or persons.""" This definition is generally in
accord with the purposes behind the riot-liability statute, but it lowers
the number of persons required to the point where the liability statute
could be misused; for example, a barroom brawl, a band of teenagers
"mugging" a pedestrian and a group of armed bank robbers would all
qualify as "rioters" under this definition. Since the liability statute
attempts to deter major riot damage and not all violent crimes against
persons or property involving three or more persons, the minimum
number of rioters should be set at a level, admittedly arbitrary, where
the "usual" police response will not be sufficient to cope with the
danger, such as 15 to 20 persons.
III. Conclusions
Since the result of allocating riot costs to property owners in the
urban ghettos will be the withdrawal of business establishments and
services from these neighborhoods, such an allocation cannot be made
without intensifying the frustrations and economic problems of ghetto
residents. Private insurance alone cannot accomplish the necessary tasks
of loss spreading and deterrence. Urban area and assigned risk plans
will either spread losses arbitrarily and inadequately or drive ghetto
merchants from the area in question, or both. Such schemes also fail
to provide incentives to the parties who are best able to deter future
riots. Establishing the liability of state and municipal governments for
riot damage will provide a measure of deterrence to future violence,
but these entities are not financially able to bear the costs. Accordingly,
a program of state and local liability with federal insurance at subsi-
dized rates would appear to provide the best combination of loss
spreading and deterrence available.
113. See, e.g., Harvey v. Bonner Springs, 102 Kan. 9, 169 P. 563 (1917); City of Cherry.
ville v. Hawman, 80 Kan. 170, 101 P. 994 (1909); Feinstein v. City of New York, 157 MIsc.
157, 283 N.Y.S. 335 (N.Y. Mun. Ct. 1935); see generally Note, Communal Liability for
Mob Violence, 49 HARv. L. REv. 1362, 1363-65 (1936).
114. H.R. 421, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., at 2, lines 11-14 (1967), which passed the House
of Representatives on July 19, 1967, and is now pending before the Senate Committee ol
the Judiciary. This is the so-called "anti-riot" bill which makes it a federal crime to use
interstate commerce in the promotion or incitement of a "riot."
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